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ABSTRACT
I extend Butler and Cornaggia (2011) to examine the impact on agricultural productivity of
shocks in access to capital and the impact of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in
moderating these shocks. Adapting their empirical methodology in Butler and Cornaggia (2011),
I find that the financial crisis of 2008 exacerbates the negative relation between counties with
low access to capital and productivity. Further, I find that this negative relation is reduced in
counties where more banks took advantage of TARP financing. My results underscore the
impact of access to capital on productivity and also suggest that the TARP has beneficial effects
in the agricultural sector.

Introduction
I extend the study of Butler and Cornaggia (2011) that looked at the relationship of
access to finance and how it impacted crop productivity of soybeans and corn. The authors
examine this relationship during the ethanol boom when there was an increase in the demand of
corn. I use their empirical model and adjust my sample period in order to look at the impacts of
the 2008 financial crisis. I then pull into account a measure that captures the influence the TARP
has in moderating the effects of the financial crisis. The TARP was enacted by the government in
late 2008 in order to stabilize our economy and increase liquidity in our financial sector. The
underlying purpose of the government’s action was to create opportunity for lending to occur so
the markets would not freeze and further worsen the U.S. economy.
There have been many studies to measure the impacts of the TARP. However, little
research has been done to see how the TARP affected the agricultural sector. It is important to
take into consideration the effects of such governmental actions in all industries. Looking at
impacts as seen in the agricultural sector is very different to most similar studies that have
focused on more industrial settings and productivity at the firm level.
However, if a similar crisis occurred again agriculture is one of two industries the
government might consider infusing more capital into. The agricultural sector is an industry that
is much more efficient at generating input (capital infusions) to economic output. Therefore, if
the government finds themselves in a similar situation to 2008, it would be beneficial to
understand how the TARP affected and impacted the agricultural sector in particular because it
was one of the few industries that show a high economic return from capital infusions (Aardt and
Naidoo 2010).
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Based on my results, I find that the financial crisis did have a negative impact on
productivity for the set of counties most likely to be impacted by the financial crisis. I
specifically examine productivity impacts of the financial crisis for counties with poor access to
finance relative to counties with better access to finance. Among others things, TARP was
supposed to provide capital injections to banks to help with lending. Therefore, when there are
more TARP banks in a county, then the productivity hampering effects of having low deposits
(i.e. the poor access to finance measure) are offset by the lending incentive effects of TARP. In
my research I found this to be true; this brings us to the conclusion that TARP did bring positive
light to the dark days of the 2008 financial crisis.
Section two details my literature review and hypothesis development. Section three
presents the research design and data. Section four discusses the results. Section five discusses
supplemental testing, and I conclude with section six.

Literature Review & Hypothesis
During the early and mid-2000s, the United States’ economy was hit with several crises.
The technology bubble burst mid-way through the year 2000. The terrorist attacks of 2001
brought the country to its knees. Unemployment and entrepreneurial failures were on the rise,
and there was an increase in corporate scandals during these years. The combination of all of
these events created a situation of economic uncertainty amongst the United States people. As
the decade was coming to a close, the ever famous 2008 Financial Crisis hit the country and
impacted the lives of millions. The housing bubble burst, people lost their jobs on a grand scale,
and banks were filing for bankruptcy. In the midst of all these different crises, each having their
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own impact on the people and industry, the government decided to announce a new program in
an effort to help get the country back on its feet.
In late September 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported that the financial crisis had
continued to march downward. Banks essentially stopped lending to each other, both directly
and indirectly, by charging exceedingly higher rates. These actions put further strain on the U.S.
and European economies and brought their lending capacities to a standstill (Mollenkamp 2008).
Following this announcement the Wall Street Journal put out an article discussing how the
United States’ financial system resembled a patient in intensive care. At that point the economy
could not “fix” itself and was seemingly at the point of no return. “The illness seems to be
overwhelming the self-healing tendencies of markets” (Hilsenrath 2008).
In effect, during the 2000s, both individuals and banks had taken on way too much debt.
Due to these actions, the banks found themselves in a situation where they could not pay back
their creditors. In order to stop the worsening dilemma, banks needed to do three things; mark
down the value of distressed assets, pay off debt, and rebuild their capital cushion (Hilsenrath
2008). These items needed to occur quickly and efficiently; however, they all negatively
impacted their ability to boost the economy causing further constraint on bank lending.
The United States’ government soon answered these concerns with The Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), specifically the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). This program was
launched by the U.S. Department of Treasury to stabilize the financial system in this time of
economic uncertainty in our country. The Troubled Asset Relief fund was created on October 3,
2008, following the passing of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. It gave the U.S.
Treasury $700 billion dollars to issue in order to provide capital in aiding financial institutions.
The Dodd-Frank Act later reduced the $700 billion authorized to $475 billion (United States
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Treasury). The program focused on providing capital to financial institutions that met the
necessary requirements. The main driver behind this program was the fear of all lending coming
to a standstill causing a continued downward spiral for our nation’s economy if the government
did not intervene.
Although the government stood firmly behind its program and the positive effects it
would have, specifically in the increase of liquidity in financial institutions, many did not believe
that the program would work. It was broadly viewed as a simple bailout to banks that needed the
money to solve their problems. Many believed that the financial institutions would hold on to
the capital instead of spurring economic growth through lending (Appelbaum 2009). This idea
was well publicized across the nation in the various periodicals and journals. While a lot of the
comments were directed towards the larger banks that were bailed out (i.e. Citibank, J.P. Morgan
Chase, Eaglebank), many still viewed the overall program to be an unwise use of taxpayer
dollars. These negative opinions are where my overlying research questions derive from.
Did the Financial Crisis impact the relative productivity of corn and soybeans
consistent with increased constraints in access to finance?
Did the TARP moderate the effects of the financial crisis on productivity
consistent with an easing of access to finance constraints?

Many papers begin their discussion of the effects on the TARP by referencing the
research of Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) and their study of the “bailout” of the Japanese financial
institutions. This study, along with general public consensus, questioned if capital infusions
were the best action for our government to take during the U.S. 2008 financial crisis. More
specifically, they questioned if other alternatives would have generated more positive economic
results. The ability for these capital infusions to perform well relied heavily on weak banks
participating in the government program (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). Other factors might have
4

limited such banks from participating due to fear of the negative impacts accepting government
aid could have on their stock yields and their performance in the future (Hoshi and Kashyap
2010). If these concerns of the banks were viable, one might say that those who accepted the
capital infusions were in enough trouble that they did not have much of a choice. Therefore,
some inferred that the capital infusions were holding up already weak illiquid institutions which
could lead to asset fire sales further causing liquidity to dry up in the financial system (Diamond
2009).
The ideas discussed by Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) counteract other research that found
that banks who opted out of the TARP program did not promptly disclose. This counteracts the
logical thought that if banks were worried about their stock yields in regard to accepting TARP
they would quickly disclose the opt-out. Bens, Chyz, and Neamtiu (2014) found that 55% of
banks did not disclose their opt-out of TARP. Further research found that on average those who
did not disclose were poorer performing financial institutions. One could infer that they might
have performed better if they had accepted the TARP funding. Overall, most discussions saw
the many different result possibilities of the program being counteractive to one another.
The negative publicity of TARP and growing concern of the financial situation of our
banks and overall economy put a lot of pressure on the banks to perform well. Thus, not only
did they have to overcome the financial aspect of the crisis but the push from their stockholders
to adjust and have good projections for the future. Despite these pressures and negative
publicity, on average banks participating in the TARP had more positive financial performance
before and after the program initiation (Ng 2011). Therefore, contrary to the negative sentiment,
the TARP was aiding the banks in their endeavors. Market valuations diverged from their
fundamentals due to investor sentiment and not lack of performance which proved to be evidence
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of the negativity connation owners put with their companies being “bailed out” (Hoshi and
Kashyap 2010).
The important notion to take into consideration is that many of these papers showed the
TARP to have a positive impact on bank performance and overall lending. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that TARP did moderate the effects of the financial crisis and was a
responsible action from a U.S. government policy standpoint.
TARP investments increased the loan supply by an annual rate of 6.43% for banks
categorized as having below Tier 1 ratios, defined as Tier 1 (core) capital divided by riskweighted total assets (Li 2013). This increase in loan supply further suggests that banks that
accepted governmental aid via TARP used roughly one third of the capital infusions to support
loans lended out to consumers (Li 2013). The study done by Li is not similar to mine in terms of
showing concrete economic impact, but it does suggest that the TARP created opportunity for
positive, impactful economic opportunity.

Hypothesis:
My analysis observes the relationship of the financial crisis and Troubled Asset Relief
Program and each of their impacts on the agricultural sector by looking at crop yields, essentially
measuring how productive farmers were in periods before the financial crisis (when capital was
less difficult to obtain) relative to periods after the financial crisis (when capital access is
constrained). Butler and Cornaggia (2011) discussed how a farmer’s budget is heavily reliant on
how much capital they can receive. Capital shows to be very impactful on how productive the
farmers can be; this is due to farmer’s having to pay for a majority of their costs up front and not
receiving any revenues until the end of the harvesting season. The more money they have access
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to for seed, fertilizer, and many other inputs can have huge consequences on how well their crop
performs. Based on these facts and those proved by Butler and Cornaggia (2011) my first
hypothesis looks at the impact that strictly the financial crisis has on crop productivity. Due to
the financial crisis causing banks to be willing to loan out less of their money, my first
hypothesis assumes gaining access to capital was much harder for farmers post financial crisis in
the years of 2009, 2010, and 2011.

H1: There is a more negative association between productivity and access to finance in
the post financial crisis period.

The second main focus in my study is the interaction of the counties with low access to
capital and the TARP. For my second hypothesis I examine the effect that I propose in
hypothesis 1 to see if it is moderated when low access to capital counties have more TARP
backed deposits (i.e. more banks participating in the TARP program). I focus on if counties with
more banks that received TARP funding showed greater productivity. Thus, I make the
assumption that low access to capital counties that have more banks participating in the TARP
program would have higher crop productivity than banks in a similar financial situation (low
access to capital) with a lower ratio of bank deposits backed by the TARP. My assumption is
based on that the TARP increases the amount of loans lent out, further proving the results of
Butler and Cornaggia (2011) that the amount of capital available has a large impact on the
success of productivity.
H2: The more negative association between productivity and access to finance in the
post financial crisis period is moderated by the TARP bank presence.

Research Design & Data:
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The data I used to generate my tests is captured annually at a county level across twelve
Midwestern, high crop yielding states. The states in my study are as follows: Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin. I gathered data from the same twelve states as Butler and Cornaggia (2011) for
the years 2005 through 2011, excluding 2008. My sample period includes the ethanol boom,
financial crisis, and issuance of the TARP. Butler and Cornaggia (2011) looked at periods before
and after the ethanol boom to test their theory. I focus on periods after the ethanol boom so that
the effect of the ethanol boom does not confound the effects I document in my study. The
beginning of the ethanol boom was in the year 2005. I use the years 2005-2007 as my
comparative sample prior to the 2008 financial crisis and the years of 2009 through 2011 to
measure the economic impacts exposed by the financial crisis. For my research method, I used
the same empirical model that was used in Butler and Cornaggia (2011) (see below). Subscripts
I, t, and k denote county, year, and crop respectively. I perform a multivariate ordinary least
squares regression, using the same model for both corn and soybean yields.
Yield_Cornit = α0 + β1Financeit + β2Crisis_Periodt + β3Finance*Crisis_Periodit
+ β4TARPit + β5Finance*TARPit + βnXit + βkS + ei
Based on my model and research design, I should be able to see support of Hypothesis 1
in the interaction of the Finance and Crisis_Period variables. I expect to find a negative
coefficient in this interaction as it captures the difference in output in the financial crisis period
when finance is poor (Finance =0) and the TARP ratio is zero compared to when finance is
higher (Finance = 1). Support for Hypothesis 2 will be found in the interaction of the Finance,
Crisis_Period, and TARP variables. It explains the change documented in Finance_Crisis_Period
in the relation to the change of TARP funding. Specifically, the increasing TARP counteracts the
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negative impact on productivity brought about by low access to capital in the post financial crisis
period. I expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive.
Independent Variables:
The first independent variable of interest is access to finance. I sum all of the bank
deposits held in banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) in any given
county; this data can be found on their website. Butler and Cornaggia (2011) found that banks
with more deposits make more agricultural loans; this was one of their key insights for
understanding the impact of access to finance on crop productivity. My main measure of access
to finance is of the counties that are in the lowest quintile of bank deposits. My results suggest
that for counties in the lowest quintile, productivity is relatively lower during the financial crisis.
This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that banks were, on average, less willing
to loan money following the financial crisis
Another independent variable and the one unique to my study is one that represents the
impact of the Troubled Asset Relief Program. This variable is the ratio of the sum of all banks
deposits held within banks that received the TARP funding to the sum of all bank deposits held
within the same given county. I gathered this data from the U.S. Treasury Department by
looking at the Transaction Report data from October 1st 2010. I chose to use this data because it
showed the best representation of the TARP because by this point all firms have been selected
for the program and have received funding.
The other variable unique to my study is the crisis period. This is an indicator variable
equal to 1 for years after crisis period (2009-2011) and 0 for years prior to the financial crisis
(2005-2007). In my study, data from the years of 2009, 2010, and 2011 are defined as the post
crisis period because they occurred after the initial financial crisis of 2008. It was during these
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years that the economy was distressed and many changes in the financial sector were occurring.
The years of 2005, 2006, and 2007 are before the financial crisis hit and are used as a baseline to
look at the impacts that the financial crisis has on productivity.
Dependent Variables:
The dependent variables used in this study are the corn and soybean yields for the given
years. I gathered the data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) website. I
took the county level of bushels harvested per acre for each crop to measure the output.
Control Variables:
In my study I used the same control variables found in that of Butler and Cornaggia
(2011). As expected the weather has a huge impact on the success of a harvested crop. I
controlled for this by gathering observations of precipitation and growing degree days from
Weather Underground. Growing degree days is a typical, relevant measure used in the
agricultural industry. There is one slight variation in our studies; Butler and Cornaggia (2011)
took four weather stations from each state and assigned all counties within the state to one of the
four chosen weather stations. I chose the most centrally located weather station in each state and
assigned its results to all the counties in that state. This is due to my inability to replicate the
assumptions of Butler and Cornaggia (2011) for county weather station assignment. This is under
the assumption that weather will not have a significant differentiation across a given state.
I also controlled for population density, as this can be directly tied to both crop yields and
county level bank deposits. I calculated population density by using the estimates of county
population from 2005 to 2011 found on the US Census Bureau website, and then divided the
estimate of a county’s population by the county’s square mileage. I control for economic
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conditions with county level unemployment rates and per capita income. These data sets were
also available on the US Census Bureau website.
Per capita income from 2009 through 2011 could be found on the US Census Bureau
website for the entirety of my sample period. However, for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 only
partial data sets were available. Due to this I estimate some of the per capita data. I did this by
running a model for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011 of per capita income, unemployment, and
population density. I then analyzed my model and calculated a beta from the years that I have
full data sets. I used this beta to estimate the per capita income for the years 2005, 2006, and
2007. Therefore, for 2005-2007 per capita income is an estimate based off of a function of my
beta, unemployment rate, and population density. I checked the robustness of this estimate
against my partial data sets gathered for 2005-2007 and found it to be accurate.

Results
I pooled all of the data together for all years included in my sample period. I then
performed univariate t-tests on the average difference in means. I partitioned the data set on
Crisis_Period which determined two groups: prior to the financial crisis and post financial crisis.
After parting out the data I calculated the averages of the yields for the two subsets and
performed a t-test on average differences in means.
I then further partitioned the data based on my finance variable. I partitioned the data by
counties in the lowest quintile of my study with poorest access to capital and the remaining
counties who were not under such strenuous capital restraints. From this partition you see that
counties with greater access to capital have a higher increase in productivity seen in both corn
and soybean yields after the financial crisis. Visuals of these changes can be seen in Figures

11

1&2. Figure 3 shows the results of my univariate t-tests on average difference in means. The
increase of productivity seen in the high access to capital counties show statistical significance
for both crops. However, for counties with low access to capital the increase in soybeans was not
statistically significant and for corn, while statistically significant, is not as large as it is in the
counties with more access to capital.
Therefore, the baseline trend shows to be an increase in output over time, and this
increase was not greatly impacted by the 2008 financial crisis except for counties with low
access to capital. If that was the case, the baseline trend was halted with respect to soy and to
some extent corn. This would be the case if the demand for soy was increasing over time, even
in the financial crisis, but farmers in areas with low access to capital could not meet these
demands because they did not have the resources to produce due to the banks not lending as
much money after the crisis period. This reduced lending can also explain why counties with
lower access to capital have lower corn yields when compared to those counties with more
access to capital.
For my preliminary support for H2, I have Figures 3 & 4. For these results I partitioned
my data set based on their access to finance and then further divided the data based on their
TARP ratios. Based on the division of the data set one should be able to recognize the impact
that the TARP has on the productivity based on the average bushels per acre that is recorded for
each group. The results show that counties with low access to capital and high TARP ratios
harvested roughly four bushels more per acre of soybeans than counties with low access to
capital and low TARP ratios. The increase of productivity due to TARP can also be seen in the
counties with higher access to capital, but the results are not as significant.
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The results of my multivariate tests are compiled in Table 5. I accounted for state fixed
effects for soy and corn yields in columns 2 and 4 respectively. For H1 this made my results
more statistically significant. I see strong support for H1 which stated that there is a more
negative association between productivity and access to finance in the post financial crisis
period. In terms of crop productivity one can assume, based off of these results, (taking into
account state fixed affects) that farmers in counties with low access to finance harvested -3.6
bushels of soybeans per acre compared to farmers in counties with higher access to finance.
My results do not support H2 as strongly, specifically my results from the corn yields. I
find that the results from corn yields do not show to be statistically significant. However, the
results do prove to be significant when looking at my results for soybeans. Note that this is a
positive relationship due my Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP variable showing the TARP
mitigating the effects of the Finance_Crisis_Period interaction.
We can question why corn does not show significant results in this test. One reason for
this is that corn and soybeans are very different crops and are significantly different markets. I
discussed that the time period of my study is after the ethanol boom. This could cause the TARP
to have less of an impact because the demand for the crop is still significantly rising.

Supplemental Testing
An additional regression that I ran was based on lending based on the “type” of bank in
the selected counties. The call reports that were used to gather deposit data for my finance
variable banks can be categorized as being agricultural banks. Due to my study showing how the
TARP impacted the agricultural sector, I chose to see if banks being categorized as such would
show different results. I introduced this additional test separately to consider heavy agricultural
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lending presence to see if the effects that I proved might be stronger. I partition the regression by
dividing the counties at the annual median based on a ratio defined by the amount of deposits
from agricultural banks divided by the total amount of deposits in the county. This gave me two
different groups to run through the regression (Agro 0 and Agro 1).
I define Agro 0 as the group of counties with a lower agricultural banking ratio. I find
that for both groups my hypothesis holds true with counties who have lower access to capital
having a more negative impact on their crop production during the crisis period. However, when
I look at the results based on my three way interaction term and see that the TARP has a much
larger impact in the counties that have a higher ratio of agricultural banks. This can especially be
seen in Table 6 with the t-statistic tripling for the Agro 1 counties when looking at soy yield.
Furthermore, when you look at the corn yields, the impact of the TARP is insignificant for the
Agro = 0 group, but the TARP showed to have a significant impact on the counties with more.
These results would be expected if farmers are more likely to do business with the banks
that are categorized as agricultural financial institutions. These banks may be smaller and closer
to where the farmers are. Since the TARP provided a lot more capital to the banks, and farm
loans tend to be viewed as low risk loan, the TARP could be viewed as providing extensive
capital to be used in financing low risk loans. This concept does not explain why the TARP
variable was less significant in the corn yields. However, as previously mentioned little impact
on corn yields could easily be explained by corn simply being a different crop that holds several
different purposes. One of those purposes is ethanol and all of my study time periods were after
the ethanol boom when demand for corn was still on the rise.
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Conclusions
Based on my results and supplemental testing, I find further support for the findings of
Butler and Cornaggia (2011) that access to capital has significant implications in terms of crop
productivity and the producer success using exogenous shocks in access to capital. In addition, I
found that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was successful in mitigating the effects of the
financial crisis in helping to spur economic growth. This output generated by farmers shows a
physical example of how governmental input of capital infusions increased economic output.
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Figures 1, 2, & 3
Preliminary Support for H1
Yield_Soy
45
44
43
42

41

Before Crisis

40

Post Crisis

39
38
37
Finance = 1

Finance = 0

Yield_Corn

Univariate T-Test Avg. Means

Before Crisis
(A)

Post Crisis
(B)

Correlation

Mean

Mean

Difference

t-statistic

Soy
Finance = 1
Finance = 0

40.122
42.994

40.249
44.547

-0.1271
-1.5536

-0.16
-5.59

Corn
Finance = 1
Finance = 0

121.3
138.8

128.5
149.4

-7.1732
-10.587

-2.98
-11.61

18

Comparison of
(A) and (B)

Figures 4 & 5
Preliminary Support for H2

Yield_Soy
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Post Crisis High TARP
Post Crisis Low TARP
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Rank = 1 deposits

Rank= 5 deposits

Yield_Corn

157
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147
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137
132
127
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117

Before Crisis
Post Crisis High TARP
Post Crisis Low TARP

Rank = 1 deposits

Rank= 5 deposits
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Table 1
Data Descriptives
Variable
Yield_Soy
Yield_Corn
Deposits
Finance
TARP_Deposit_Ratio
Unemployment
Per_Capita_Income
Population_Density
Precipitation
GDD

N
5111
5296
6286
6286
6286
6251
6251
6252
6286
6286

Mean
Std Dev
25th Pctl
Median
75th Pctl
43.2091763 9.5391719
37.2
44.8
50.3
140.751888 32.6204396
121.9
146
164.1
1250981.64 6457318.63
151277 311081.5
678958
0.1994909 0.3996495
0
0
0
0.2669359 0.2691362
0 0.1951105 0.4415332
6.424764 2.9271153
4.2
5.6
8.2
24040.96
2446.53 22684.27 23877.01
25347.86
121.36592 357.122489 12.985206 33.415514 81.2902407
17.8700859 8.2062959
13.77
17.51
22.19
8.0149895 0.2260632 7.820038 8.0401247 8.2035777

Presentation of pooled summary statistics for county-year crop observations. I examine counties in the 12 mid-western states from 2005 through
2011, excluding the year 2008, with non-zero yields of corn and soybeans. Individual crop yields are measured in bushels per acre. Crop yields
data come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), which is affiliated with the United States Department of Agriculture.
Deposits represent the sum of all deposits held within banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for a given county and
a given year. Population Density is equal to the county population for a given year divided by the number of square miles in the county.
Unemployment is equal to the percentage of the working population without employment for a given county-year. Per Capita Income is the
average personal income for a given county-year, measured in thousands of dollars per person. Population, unemployment, and per capita income
data come from the US Census Bureau’s website. Precipitation and GDD represent the inches of precipitation and number of growing degree
days in an associated crop’s region from May through October of a given year, respectively.

Table 2
Descriptive Crisis Period = 1
Variable
Yield_Soy
Yield_Corn
Deposits
Finance
TARP_Deposit_Ratio
Unemployment
Per_Capita_Income
Population_Density
Precipitation
GDD

N
2503
2649
3145
3145
3145
3129
3129
3129
3145
3145

Mean

Std Dev

25th Pctl

Median

75th Pctl

43.9223332 9.4304192
38.5
45.1
50.5
145.921329 31.0057019
127.3
151
168.5
1446918.93 7601255.82
169235
350785
749643
0.1993641 0.3995858
0
0
0
0.2680304 0.2673115
0 0.1988562 0.4403638
7.9716523 3.1269524
5.4
7.9
10.1
23161.23
2239.53
22066.1 23105.11
24234.86
122.170239 357.343356 12.922754 33.390671 82.0785957
20.2714754 9.1337872
15.63
19.28
26.16
7.9864148 0.2428075 7.776535 8.0297585 8.1909089

These descriptives derive from the same sources as those above. However, they are derived from Crisis Period 1(Years 2009, 2010, 201
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Table 3
Descriptive Crisis Period = 0
Variable
Yield_Soy
Yield_Corn
Deposits
Finance
TARP_Deposit_Ratio
Unemployment
Per_Capita_Income
Population_Density
Precipitation
GDD

N
2608
2647
3141
3141
3141
3122
3122
3123
3141
3141

Mean
Std Dev
25th Pctl
Median
75th Pctl
42.5247316 9.5944599
36
44
50
135.578542 33.3734231
117
141.1
159.9
1054794.82 5052788.96
135666
279604
606597
0.199618 0.3997768
0
0
0
0.26584 0.2709891
0 0.1913039 0.4415463
4.8744074 1.5983856
3.7
4.7
5.7
24922.66
2325.1 23252.24 24845.88
26178.4
120.560057 356.956469 13.00842 33.450474 80.1882654
15.4656383 6.3009851
13.14
15.84
19.59
8.0436006 0.2040177 7.8743588 8.0545226 8.2406489

These descriptives derive from the same sources as those above. However, they are derived from Crisis Period 0(Years 2005, 2006, 2007)
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Table 4
Multivariate Results
(1)
soy_output
Finance
-0.376
(-0.42)
Crisis_Period
2.823***
(5.92)
Finance_Crisis_Period
-3.685***
(-5.05)
Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP 11.87***
(4.01)
Unemployment
-0.739***
(-5.44)

(3)
corn_output
-5.431
(-1.76)
11.35***
(7.66)
-7.163**
(-2.97)
7.839
(0.97)
-1.997***
(-5.18)

-0.000234
(-1.67)
1.569***
(5.91)
2.468***
(8.29)
-4.038**
(-2.71)
72.06***
(5.57)

(2)
soy_output
0.349
(0.54)
2.936***
(7.91)
-3.617***
(-6.03)
5.477*
(2.16)
-0.972***
(-8.06)
0.000315**
(-2.94)
0.438*
(2.21)
3.652***
(11.07)
-8.018***
(-8.28)
108.2***
(13.05)

-0.00128**
(-2.82)
6.726***
(7.53)
9.864***
(10.00)
-27.71***
(-6.18)
350.8***
(9.02)

(4)
corn_output
-0.174
(-0.07)
13.72***
(11.55)
-8.802***
(-4.19)
-5.541
(-0.76)
-3.475***
(-8.23)
0.00163***
(-3.53)
3.002***
(4.22)
6.610***
(5.72)
-69.01***
(-23.11)
720.2***
(27.01)

State Fixed Effects
R-Squared
N
t statistics in parentheses

No
0.0921
5087

Yes
0.4297
5087

No
0.1585
5274

Yes
0.4168
5274

="* p<0.05

** p<0.01

***
p<0.001"

Per_Capita_Income
Population_Density
Precipitation
GDD
_cons

Individual regressions for corn and soybeans. This table presents ordinary least squares regression results based on county-year-crop
observations. The regression specification is Yield_Cornit = α0 + β1Financeit + β2Crisis_Periodt + β3Finance*Crisis_Periodit + β4TARPit +
β5Finance*TARPit + βnXit + βkS + ei The dependent variable is crop yield, measured in bushels per acre. I separately sort corn and soybean
.Regressions 1& 3 include no state fixed effects; Regressions 2 & 4 include state dummy variables. Low Deposits is a dummy variable equal to
one if the level of bank deposits in a given county falls into the bottom quintile of all county-level bank deposits for a given year, and zero
otherwise. Finance captures output when there is low access to capital in periods before the financial crisis and where access to TARP is zero
Crisis_Period captures output during the financial crisis when access to capital is better and there is no TARP. Finance_Crisis_Period captures the
difference in output in the financial crisis period when finance is poor and TARP is zero. Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP documents the relation in
Finance_Crisis_Period as it changes as the level of TARP funding changes. Population Density is equal to the county population for a given year
divided by the number of square miles in the county. Unemployment is equal to the percentage of the working population without employment
for a given county-year. Per Capita Income is the average personal income for a given county-year. Precipitation and GDD represent the inches of
precipitation and number of growing degree days in an associated crop’s region.
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Table 5
Agricultural Bank Results
(1)
Agro = 0
soy_output

(2)
Agro = 1
soy_output

(3)
(4)
Agro = 0
Agro = 1
corn_output corn_output

Finance

2.709
(1.53)

0.147
(0.13)

11.20*
(2.20)

-4.213
(-1.03)

Crisis_Period

1.207
(1.67)

1.961**
(3.07)

6.948**
(3.20)

8.549***
(4.13)

Finance_Crisis_Period

-5.069**
(-3.23)

-2.555**
(-3.26)

-12.41*
(-1.92)

-4.045
(-1.59)

Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP

5.776
(1.62)

16.72***
(4.77)

-6.668
(-0.75)

17.12
(1.79)

Unemployment

0.369*
(2.15)

-1.387***
(-5.82)

0.785
(1.60)

-3.181***
(-4.40)

Per_Capita_Income

0.000311
(1.81)

-0.000267
(-1.13)

0.000125
(0.25)

-0.000788
(-0.98)

Population_Density

1.752***
(5.20)

3.542***
(6.59)

7.778***
(7.40)

12.74***
(6.97)

Precipitation

1.739***
(5.28)

6.247***
(3.64)

7.811***
(7.54)

20.53***
(3.68)

GDD

-0.344
(-0.20)

-5.583**
(-2.67)

-20.45***
(-4.02)

-30.12***
(-4.63)

_cons

21.15
(1.35)

73.51***
(3.80)

233.9***
(5.16)

322.5***
(5.28)

R-Sqaured
N

0.125
2394

0.1878
2693

0.1986
2461

0.243
2813

** p<0.01

***
p<0.001"

t statistics in parentheses
="* p<0.05
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